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Under the current regulatory scheme, banks directly engaged
in mutual fund activities are regulated under the federal banking
laws by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, whereas bank
subsidiaries and non-bank affiliates engaged in mutual fund activ-
ities must be registered broker-dealers that are subject to Securities
and Exchange Commission regulation under the federal securities
laws. The regulatory tools provided to the banking regulators by
the federal banking laws were designed to provide for the protec-
tion of depositors and for the safety and soundness of the bank.
The remedies available under the federal banking laws dealing
with violations involving the sales of securities, however, are not as
comprehensive as those available under the federal securities laws.
Mr. Caldarelli contends, in this very comprehensive Article, that
while previous efforts to allow for functional regulation of securi-
ties have failed, the time is right to give the Securities and
Exchange Commission the authority to regulate all securities activ-
ities regardless of whether the entity engaging in the activities is a
bank or a securities firm. In conclusion, Mr. Caldarelli argues that
because of several pivotal reasons the bank exclusion from the stat-
* Mr. Caldarelli received his J.D. from Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center, and he recently received his L.L.M. in Securities
Regulation from Georgetown University.
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utory provision of the federal securities laws defining "broker/
dealer" and "investment adviser" should be eliminated, which, in
effect, would result in the Securities and Exchange Commission
obtaining functional regulation of all participants in the securities
markets.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 12
II. BACKGROUND ON BANK SECURITIES ACTVITIES .......... 15
A. Erosion of Glass-Steagall ..................... 18
B. Bank Authority to Engage in Mutual Fund
Activities ........................................ 21
C. Concerns Raised by Bank Mutual Fund
A ctivities ..................... .................... 24
III. REGULATION OF MUTUAL FUND ACTIVITIES ; ............ 25
A. Bank Exclusion from Federal Securities Laws .... 25
B. Regulatory Structure of Bank Mutual Fund
A ctivities ......................................... 29
C. Interagency Statement on Nondeposit Investment
Products ..... ............................ 33
IV. ADEQUACY OF THE INTERAGENCY STATEMENT FOR
REGULATING BANK SECURITIES AACTIvITES ............. 37
V. CONCLUSION .......................................... 44
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1980's, when it was still believed that the
Glass-Steagall Act barred bank mutual fund' activities, a number
of federal banking agency rulings and court decisions have inter-
preted the Glass-Steagall Act to allow banks to engage in virtually
1. An- investment company is a corporation, trust, or partnership which.
invests pooled funds of shareholders in securities appropriate to the funds'
objectives. Mutual funds, also known as open-end investment companies, are the
most popular type of investment company.
A mutual fund is an investment company that pools money from
shareholders and invests in a variety of securities, including stocks, bonds and
money market securities. A mutual fund stands ready to buy back (redeem) its
shares at their current net asset value. Most mutual funds offer new shares on a
continuous basis.
A closed-end investment company issues a limited number of shares and
does not redeem the shares. Closed-end shares are traded in the securities
markets with supply and demand determining the price. See generally Bank
Mutual Funds, Minority Staff of the House Banking Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1993).
[Vol. 17:11
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every phase of the mutual fund business.2 Banks are now permit-
ted to engage in the same mutual fund activities as a securities
firm except that a bank cannot act as an underwriter for the
mutual fund.3 The permissible bank mutual fund activities
include acting as: (1) adviser for the fund by providing profes-
sional investment advice and implementing strategies and portfo-
lio management; (2) custodian by maintaining the fund's
securities; (3) broker by executing the purchase and sale of securi-
ties for the fund; and (4) administrator and servicing agent by pro-
viding reports to shareholders, recordkeeping, and accounting
assistance.4 Investment in mutual funds has grown substantially
as investors, dissatisfied with low yields on federally insured bank
certificates of deposit, are seeking higher yields and are moving
their money out of bank deposits and into uninsured mutual
funds.5 Mutual fund sales by commercial banks have shown a cor-
responding growth in an effort by banks to meet their customer's
needs, preserve customer relationships, and generate fee income
to off-set the loss of deposits.
6
The substantial growth in bank mutual fund activities has
caused attention to be focused on the existing statutory regulatory
2. Melanie L. Fein, Government Policy on Bank Mutal Fund Activities: An
Overview, BANK POL'Y REP. (P-H) No. 21 (Nov. 1-15, 1993).
3. Bank Mutual Funds, Minority Staff of the House Banking Comm., 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). It is uncertain how "underwriting" applies to a mutual
fund. Bank mutual fund experts believe that it is a misnomer to apply the term
"underwriting" to mutual funds. The Federal Reserve stated that the
underwriting falls to the fund's "distributor" in a mutual fund context. The
distributor performs the following functions: (1) handling the distribution of the
fund's shares; (2) conducting sales presentations to promote investment in the
fund; and, (3) planning and implementing advertising, sales and marketing
strategies. Mutual fund activities of a bank and a "distributor" have blurred in
recent years to the point where it could be said that banks do "underwrite"
mutual funds. Id.
4. Id.
5. Mutual fund assets have increased twenty-six percent since December
1992 and now exceed two trillion dollars. It is also estimated that about twenty-
eight percent of U.S. households own mutual fund shares. See Investment Co.
Inst. Press Release No. 94-02, at 4, Jan. 24, 1994.
6. Public Policy Issues Surrounding the Proposed Merger between the
Dreyfuss Corp. and Mellon Bank Corp., Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigation of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, H.R. No. 103-94, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the
Currency) (net assets of bank proprietary funds, funds where the bank acts as
investment adviser, doubled between 1989 and 1991 and doubled again between
1991 and 1993 to two hundred billion dollars) [hereinafter Ludwig Testimony].
1995]
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scheme 7 in which direct mutual fund activities by banks are regu-
lated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (hereinafter
"OCC") and are excluded from the federal regulatory scheme
which regulates broker-dealers and investment advisers.8 The
concern on the part of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(hereinafter "SEC") is due largely to the apparent conflicting focus
of bank regulation, which is generally to ensure the safety and
soundness of the bank and depositor protection, and that of the
federal securities laws in which investor protection is of para-
mount importance. 9 The SEC believes there should be functional
regulation of securities activities whereby banks would be regu-
lated according to their function rather than the type of charter
they possess. 10 Under this regulatory approach, the SEC would
regulate both the securities activities of banks and securities
firms.11
Part II of this Article provides background information con-
cerning traditional Glass-Steagall restrictions on bank securities
activities, the erosion of these restrictions, and the authority of
banks to engage in mutual fund activities. Part III discusses both
the regulation of mutual fund activities which includes bank
exclusions from the federal securities laws and the regulatory
structure for mutual fund activities of banks, and it also reviews
the recent Guidelines for National Banks Involved in Retail
7. The debate over functional regulation of securities activities has been
going on for some time. Congressman Markey introduced the "Bank Broker-
Dealer Act" on May 28, 1987, but it was not passed. Also, Rule 3b-9 was struck
down by the court. See ABA v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Recently,
similar reforms, that included House Bill 797, "The Securities Regulatory
Equality Act of 1991," House Bill 6, 'The Financial Institutions Safety and
Consumer Choice Act of 1991," and Senate Resolution 543, "The Comprehensive
Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991," were
introduced by Congress.
8. Public Policy Issues Surrounding the Proposed Merger between the
Dreyfuss Corp. and Mellon Bank Corp., Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigation of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, H.R. No. 103-94, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission) (under the federal regulatory scheme, bank affiliates
and subsidiaries engaging in securities activities are regulated under the federal
securities laws and must register with the SEC and comply on the same level as
other broker-dealers and investment advisers) [hereinafter Testimony of
Chairman Levitt].
9. Id.
lo. Id.
11. Id.
[Vol. 17:11
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss1/3
1995] BANKING LAW 15
Nondeposit Investment Sales. Part IV examines concerns of the
SEC with the adequacy of these guidelines, and it looks at legisla-
tive proposals for changing the regulatory structure for banks
involved in securities activities. Part V of this Article concludes
that Congress should grant the SEC functional regulatory author-
ity over direct bank mutual fund activities.
II. BACKGROUND OF BANK SECuRITIES ACTIVITIES
The Glass-Steagall Act of 193312 was passed to protect deposi-
tors from the widespread bank closings that took place during the
12. There are five provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act dealing with the
separation of banks and their affiliates from investment banking activities. They
are:
(1) Section 16 limits the power of national banks in dealing in securities and
stock to "purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse,
solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its
own account," and further provides that a national bank "shall not underwrite
any issue of securities or stock." The section contains an exception which
permits purchases of certain corporate securities for the bank's own account
under regulations prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency and contains
exemptions which permit the purchase, sale, and underwriting of many types of
government securities. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1988).
(2) Section 20 prohibits affiliations of member bank of the Federal Reserve
System with any entity "engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting,
public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate
participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities." 12 U.S.C.
§ 377 (1988). For purposes of functional regulation, it is important to note that
the Federal Reserve Board has permitted bank holding companies to own non-
bank "section 20 affiliates," which are registered as broker/dealers subject to SEC
oversight, that engage in limited underwriting of securities. Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1994) (statement of John P. LaWare,
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
(3) Section 21 prohibits entities engaged in the business of "issuing,
underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate
participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities" from
receiving deposits, subject to the proviso that this Section shall not prohibit
banks from "dealing in, underwriting, purchasing, and selling investment
securities" to the extent permitted to national banks under section 16. 12 U.S.C.
§ 378 (1988).
(4) Section 9 subjects state member banks to the same limitations and
conditions as national banks with respect to "purchasing, selling, underwriting,
and holding of investment securities and stocks." 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988).
(5) Section 32 prohibits officers, directors, or employees of an entity
"primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or
distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks,
5
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Great Depression.'" One of the co-sponsors of the bill, Represen-
tative Steagall, explained:
[Tihe purpose of this legislation is to protect the people of the
United States in the right to have banks in which their deposits
will be safe. They have a right to expect of Congress the establish-
ment and maintenance of a system of banks in the United States
where citizens may place their hard earnings with reasonable
expectations of being able to get them out again on demand.' 4
Congress sought to separate commercial banking from invest-
ment banking activities in order to prevent securities firm affili-
ates of banks from engaging in risky underwriting operations,
stock speculation, and maintaining a market for the bank's own
stocks, in many instances with the bank's own money.' 5 In addi-
tion to the danger of banks using bank assets for speculative
securities investments, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the
following "subtle hazards" involved in bank securities activities:
[Blecause the bank and its affiliate would be closely associated in
the public mind, public confidence in the bank might be impaired
if the affiliate performed poorly. Further, depositors of the bank
might lose money on investments purchased in reliance on the
relationship between the bank and its affiliate. The pressure on
the banks to prevent this loss of public confidence could induce the
bank to make unsound loans to the affiliate or to companies in
whose stock the affiliate has invested. Moreover, the association
between the commercial and investment bank could result in the
commercial bank's reputation for prudence and restraint being
attributed, without justification, to an enterprise selling stocks
and securities. Furthermore, promotional considerations might
induce banks to make loans to customers to be used for the
purchase of stocks and might impair the ability of the commercial
banker to render disinterested advise. 16
The pinnacle of the separation between commercial banking
and investment banking functions occurred in the Supreme
Court's decision in Investment Company Institute v. Camp.'7 The
issue in Camp was whether Regulation 9, issued by the Comptrol-
bonds, or other similar securities" from serving as an officer, director or employee
of a member bank of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
13. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 101
S.Ct. 973, 984 (1981) [hereinafter Federal Reserve Bd. v. ICI].
14. 77 Cong. Rec. 3837 (1933).
15. S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 10 (1933).
16. Federal Reserve Bd. v. ICI, 101 S.Ct. at 987, n. 38.
17. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
[Vol. 17:11
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ler of the Currency authorizing a national bank to offer its custom-
ers the opportunity to invest in a stock fund created and
maintained by the bank, was valid under the federal banking
laws."i The plan for the collective investment of managing agency
accounts approved by the Comptroller and expected to be the
model used by other banks entering this field was described by the
Court as follows:
Under the plan the bank customer tenders between $10,000 and
$50,000 to the bank, together with an authorization making the
bank the customer's managing agent. The customer's investment
is added to the fund, and a written evidence of participation is
issued which expresses in 'units of participation? the customer's
proportionate interest in fund assets. Units of participation are
freely redeemable, and transferable to anyone who has executed a
managing agency agreement with the bank. The fund is regis-
tered as an investment company under the Investment Company.
Act of 1940. The bank is the underwriter of the fund's units of
participation within the meaning of that Act. The fund has filed a
registration statement pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. The
fund is supervised by a five-member committee elected annually
by the participants pursuant to the Investment Company Act of
1940. The [SEC] has exempted the fund from the Investment
Company Act to the extent that a majority of this committee may
be affiliated with the bank, and it is expected that a majority of
this committee may be affiliated with the bank, and it is expected
that a majority always will be 'officers in the bank's trust and
investment division. The actual custody and investment of fund
assets is carried out by'the bank as investment advisor pursuant
to a management agreement. Although the Investment Company
Act requires that this management agreement be approved annu-
ally by the committee, including a majority of the unaffiliated
members, or by the participants, it is expected that the bank will
continue to be investment advisor.' 9
The Court concluded that this plan was essentially an open-
end investment company, which is known as a mutual fund, and
"that the business of a mutual fund consists of buying stock 'for its
own account' and of 'issuing' and 'selling' 'stock' or 'other securi-
ties' evidencing an undivided and redeemable interest in the
assets of the fund."20 While it was well established that national
banks had the authority to "pool trustassets, or act as a managing
18. Id. at 621.
19. Id. at 622-23.
20. Id. at 625.
1995]
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agent for individuals, or purchase stock for the account of its cus-
tomers," the combination of these activities was impermissible.21
In holding that the Comptroller did not have the authority to
approve the bank activities as set forth in the plan, the Court
relied on the plain meaning of the language of section 16 and sec-
tion 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act.22
It was clear from the Court's decision in Camp that the Glass-
Steagall Act was seen as a complete barrier to national banks
entering the securities area. As the Court stated:
The Glass-Steagall Act was a prophylactic measure directed
against conditions that the experience of the 1920's showed to be
great potentials for abuse. The literal terms of that Act clearly
prevent what the Comptroller has sought to authorize here.
Because the potential hazards and abuses that flow from a bank's
entry into the mutual investment business are the same basic
hazards and abuses that Congress intended to eliminate almost 40
years ago, we cannot but apply the terms of the federal statute as
they were written. We conclude that the operation of an invest-
ment fund of the kind approved by the Comptroller involves a
bank in the underwriting, issuing, selling, and distributing of
securities in violation of ss 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act.23
A Erosion of Glass-Steagall
Ironically, the Court's concern about the "subtle hazards" of
banks once again becoming involved in investment banking activi-
ties led to the eventual erosion of many of the Glass-Steagall
restrictions on securities activities by banks.24 By structuring
activities in a manner that avoids these "subtle hazards," banks
have gradually been able to break through the Glass-Steagall bar-
rier and have become increasingly involved in securities activities.
In Federal Reserve Board v. ICI, the ICI, a mutual fund trade
association, challenged the Federal Reserve's amendment to Reg-
ulation Y which allowed bank holding companies and non-bank
21. Id. at 625.
22. Camp, 401 U.S. at 625. The Court explained that section 16 of Glass-
Steagall prohibits a bank from underwriting securities and provides that a bank
can only purchase securities upon the order and for the account of customers,
without recourse. Section 21 prohibits any person or organization engaged in
issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing securities to engage in the business
of banking. Id. at 623-24.
23. Id.
24. See supra text accompanying note 16 which summarizes the "subtle
hazards" discussed in Camp.
[Vol. 17:11
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subsidiaries to act as investment advisers to closed-end 25 invest-
ment companies.26 The Court concluded that the "subtle hazards"
as expressed in Camp would not be present where a bank acts as
an investment adviser to a closed-end investment company sub-
ject to the restrictions imposed by the Federal Reserve Board.27
The restrictions prevented the bank from extending credit to the
investment company, precluded the promotional pressure inher-
ent in investment banking, and prevented the bank from under-
writing or selling the stock of the closed-end investment
company.28
Furthermore, the Court has established that, in implement-
ing the "subtle hazards" analysis to determine whether an activity
is prohibited by Glass-Steagall, the existence of one of the "subtle
hazards" will not prohibit the activity.29 A banking practice will
be prohibited under Glass-Steagall only when all of the "subtle
hazards" are present.30  Finally, courts will treat the "subtle
hazards" analysis as a "specific instance of the Chevron principle
that requires deference to an agency's reasonable construction of
its statute's ambiguities."3'
Traditional commercial banking customers recently have
found that the securities markets provide a more attractive source
of financing and investment services than commercial banks.32
Depositors have moved their funds out of certificates of deposit
seeking higher yields on their investments.33 Mutual funds, in
particular, have emerged as a competitor to the commercial banks'
traditional role as supplier of business capital and repository of
25. See supra note 1.
26. Federal Reserve Bd. v. ICI, 101 S.Ct. 973 (1981).
27. Id. at 986.
28. The bank was obligated to render impartial advice to its customers, it
could not act as investment adviser to any investment company having a similar
name to the bank, prospectuses and sales literature of the investment company
could not be distributed by the bank, officers and employees of the bank could not
express an opinion with respect to the advisability of the purchase of securities of
the investment company, and the investment company could not locate its offices
in the same building as the bank. Id.
29. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 104
S.Ct. 2979, 2989-92 (1984).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See generally Melanie L. Fein, The Evolution of Bank Securities Activities,
738 PRACTICING LAw INSTrrUTE 793 (1991) (discussing changes in the financial
services industry since the enactment of Glass-Steagall).
33. Id.
1995]
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household wealth.34 In response to the competition for funds that
were traditionally earmarked as bank deposits, the OCC has
reacted by allowing banks to become actively involved in mutual
fund activities under the authority to approve an activity that can
be done by banks in a safe and sound manner, provide for the
needs and convenience of bank customers by giving them a
greater choice in shopping for mutual fund services, and permit-
ting banks to compete on a level playing field with other providers
of financial services, thus enhancing competition in the mutual
fund market.35
Another factor contributing to the gradual erosion of the
Glass-Steagall restrictions has been the re-evaluation of the legis-
lative history of Glass-Steagall 'concerning the justification of the
Act. The re-examination of the legislative history has revealed lit-
tle evidence that securities firms affiliated with banks 'had
engaged in risky underwriting operations, stock speculation, or
maintained a market for the bank's own stocks.36 Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has also stated, "research
over the past [fifty] years concludes, contrary to Congress' view at
the time, that bank securities activities were not a cause of the
Great Depression."37 The Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs agreed with Chairman Greenspan and con-
cluded, "abuses by commercial banks that were engaged in
securities activities were not a substantial cause of the collapse of
the financial system in the early 19301s. "31
34. Mutual funds now control approximately two trillion dollars, or about
eighty-five percent of bank deposits as compared with only ten percent in the
early 1980's, which corresponds with a steady decline in rates paid on certificates
of deposit over the same time period. In addition, mutual funds have become
very active in purchasing corporate bonds and initial public stock offerings which
has helped reduce costs to many companies and helped finance new corporations.
Brett D. Fromson, If the Boom Goes Bust... Popularity of Mutual Funds Means
More Americans are at the Mercy of the Markets, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1994, at
C1, col. 2.
35. Ludwig Testimony, supra note 6, at 1.
36. Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on the History of the Glass-Steagall Act
and its Current Relevance in the Future of the Nation's Financial Services
Industry, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
37. Hearing Before Senate Comm. on Banking Housing & Urban Affairs,
100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1987) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the
Federal Reserve).
38. S. Rep. No. 100-305, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1988).
[Vol. 17:11
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In retrospect, the enactment of Glass-Steagall seems to have
been more a result of the public outcry for reform. The Act was
an attempt by Congress to restore public confidence in the finan-
cial system following the stock market crash of 1929, rather than
an attempt to prevent the perceived abuses and conflicts of inter-
est on the part of banks involved in investment banking
operations.3 9
B. Bank Authority to Engage in Mutual Fund Activities
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act was regarded as a severe
restriction on the ability of national banks to engage in securities
activities.4 However, while section 16 places limitations on bank
securities activities, several activities were specifically preserved:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association
shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and
stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account
of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the associa-
tion shall not underwrite an issue of securities or stock.41
In addition, section 16 gives national banks a broad grant of
authority to "exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized
officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as
shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking."42
National banks are also given the express trust powers to provide
fiduciary and custodial services and to act as transfer agents.43
These statutory provisions have combined to provide the frame-
work for the authority of national banks to engage inmutual fund
activities.
39. See Fein, supra note 32.
40. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1988).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1988). Section 92(a) states:
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to
grant by special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in
contravention of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor,
administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates,
assignee, receiver, committee of estates of lunatics, or in any other
fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other
corporations which come into competition with national banks are
permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank
is located.
1995]
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The powers of banks to perform brokerage services has been
well established by several court decisions." The OCC has corre-
spondingly allowed national bank subsidiaries to include securi-
ties brokerage activities which include the purchase and/or sale,
as agent, of mutual fund shares.45 National banks and their sub-
sidiaries are also authorized to provide investment advice as part
of the incidental activities to the business of banking. 46 Banking
entities are permitted to recommend mutual funds to customers
and to act as investment adviser to the same mutual funds.4 7
The Court found that the ability of a national bank to attract
customers by advertising and marketing the services and products
offered to customers is an integral part of investment advisory and
brokerage services.4 The OCC, therefore, has concluded that
national banks are permitted to advertise their services relating
to mutual funds.4 9 Finally, national banks and their operating
subsidiaries are permitted to provide administrative and share-
44. See SIA v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207
(1984) ("Schwab"); SIA v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C.
1983), aff'd per curiam, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054
(1986) (brokerage issue).
45. Interpretive Letter No. 622 at 5, 6 (Apr. 9, 1993).
46. See, e.g., Interpretive Letter No. 622 (Apr. 9, 1993); see also Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. ICI, 450 U.S. 46 (1981); SIA v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied,
484 U.S. 1005 (1988) ("NatWest").
47. 12 C.F.R. § 225.125 (1990). Section 225.125(a) states:
Effective February 1, 1972, the Board of Governors amended § 225.4(a)
of Regulation Y to add "serving as investment adviser, as defined in
section 2(aX2) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, to an
investment company registered under that Act" to the list of activities it
has determined to be so closely related to banking or managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.
Id. Section 225.125(c) states:
Under § 225.4(a)(5), as amended, bank holding companies (which term,
as used herein, includes both their bank and nonbank subsidiaries)
may, in accordance with the previsions of § 225.4(b), act as investment
advisers to various types of investment companies, such as "open-end"
investment companies (commonly referred to as "mutual funds") and
"closed-end" investment companies.
Id.
48. Franklin Natl Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 378 (1954).
49. See Interpretive Letter No. 622 (Apr. 9, 1993) (making lobby materials
available on services, placing newspaper advertisements, sending statement
stuffers and providing other descriptions of the variety of services that are
available); see also Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit
Investment Products, (Feb. 15, 1994) (acknowledging banks advertise and
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holder services in connection with the operation of a mutual
fund.5 °
It is clear that banks, their affiliates or subsidiaries may
engage in most activities related to mutual funds. These acts
include providing investment advice to mutual funds and to cus-
tomers, brokering mutual funds, advertising and marketing their
services, and providing administrative and shareholder-related
services to mutual funds. Underwriting of mutual funds remains
the only activity that banking entities cannot provide to mutual
funds.
In 1987 the Federal Reserve Board approved the applications
of several bank holding companies to utilize subsidiaries to under-
write and deal in bank in-eligible51 securities.52 The issue faced
by the court was whether the Board's approval of this underwrit-
ing activity violated section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which
forbids a member bank of the Federal Reserve System from affili-
ating with an organization "engaged principally" in underwriting
or dealing in securities.5 3 The Board relied on its order in Bankers
Trust of New York Corp." which held that the term "engaged
principally" means any substantial activity.55 The Board con-
cluded that a subsidiary would not be engaged substantially in
bank in-eligible activities if no more that five to ten percent of
their total gross revenues were derived from such activities over a
two-year period.56 The court agreed with the Board's "engaged
principally" analysis 57 and with this decision began chipping away
at the Glass-Steagall Act's remaining barrier to bank securities
activities.
market uninsured investment products to customers and provides for full
disclosure).
50. See, e.g., Interpretive Letter No. 386 (Jan. 19, 1987) (providing
recordkeeping, accounting, and other services in connection with 12b-1 and
similar plans); Interpretive Letter No. 332 (Mar. 8, 1985) (recordkeeping, order
execution functions, and shareholder information).
51. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act expressly permits banks to
underwrite and deal in government securities known as bank-eligible securities.
12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1988). Bank in-eligible securities include municipal bonds,
corporate debt, equity securities, revenue bonds and mortgage-backed securities.
52. SIA v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 49 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
53. Id. at 50.
54. Bankers Trust of New York Corp., 73 FED. REs. BuLL. 138, 140 (1987).
55. SIA v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d at 50.
56. Id. at 50.
57. Id. at 60.
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C. Concerns Raised by Bank Mutual Fund Activities
A widespread misconception exists that mutual funds, either
purchased through banks or from stockbrokers, are covered by
FDIC insurance and are riskless investments."' An SEC survey
revealed the magnitude of the consumer confusion in the market-
place by finding that thirty-nine percent of investors mistakenly
believed that mutual funds purchased from a stockbroker are fed-
erally insured, forty-one percent mistakenly believed that money
market funds sold through banks are federally insured, twenty
percent mistakenly believed that all.mutual funds sold by banks
are federally insured and thirteen percent mistakenly believed
that they cannot lose money in a money market mutual fund. 9
Banks selling mutual funds often contribute to consumer con-
fusion by selling mutual funds in branches that have the FDIC
seal on the door and by selling funds that have the same or similar
name as the bank which create the false impression that the bank
stands behind the funds.60 Because of the steady bull market dur-
ing the past three years, the potential negative economic conse-
quences that could result from customer confusion concerning the
risks involved in mutual fund purchases have not been felt.6 '
Many analysts feel that a downward spiral in the equity markets
would have a severe negative impact on the United States'
economy.6 2
III. REGULATION OF MuTuAL FuND AcTvITIEs
A. Bank Exclusion from the Federal Securities Laws
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ("1934 Act") defines the
term "bank" in section 3(a)(6) as:
(A) a banking institution organized under the laws of the United
States, (B) a member bank of the Federal Reserve System, (C) any
other banking institution, whether incorporated or not, doing
business under the laws of any State or of the United States, a
substantial portion of the business of which consists of receiving
58. Jerry Knight, Bank Regulator Backs Mutual Fund Sales Probe;
Undercover 'Shoppers' are Proposed, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1994, at C1, col. 6.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Fromson, supra note 34, at C1, col. 2.
62. David D. Hale, chief economist at Kemper Corp., and Wall Street
economist Henry Kaufman, believe a rise in short-term interest rates will cause
a drop in stock prices. This could cause a sell-off of securities by mutual fund
shareholders which could, in turn, cause a greatly magnified bear market. Id.
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deposits or exercising fiduciary powers similar to those permitted
to national banks under the authority of the Comptroller of the
Currency pursuant to Section 92a of Title 12, and which is super-
vised and examined by State or Federal authority having supervi-
sion over banks, and which is not operated for the purpose of
evading the provisions of this chapter.
6 3
The term "broker" is defined in section 3(a)(4) as "any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for
the account of others, but does not include a bank."64 Likewise, a
"bank" is excluded from the definition of "dealer" which is defined
in section 3(a)(5) of the 1934 Act as "any person engaged in the
business of buying and selling securities for his own account,
through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank.
6 5
Because banks were already subject to regulatory oversight at
the federal and state level, Congress defined the terms "bank,"
"broker," and "dealer" in a way that made it clear that the SEC
should not have regulatory jurisdiction over banks.6 6
ABA v. SEC involved the issue of whether the SEC had the
authority under the 1934 Act to regulate banks as "broker-deal-
ers."67 In 1985, the SEC adopted Rule 3b-9 which required banks
to register as broker-dealers if they engaged in the securities bro-
kerage business for profit. 68 The SEC used its rulemaking author-
ity because of the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires"
which preceeds all 1934 Act definitions.6 9 Although banks were
excluded from the definitions of "broker" and "dealer" in the 1934
Act, the SEC believed that the context in which the bank exclu-
sions were enacted had significantly changed since 1934.70
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (1988).
64. Id. at § 78c(a)(4) (1988).
65. Id. at § 78c(a)(5) (1988).
66. ABA v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
67. Id.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-9 (1986). Rule 3b-9 provides in part:
The term "bank" as used in the definition of "broker" and "dealer" in
Sections 3(a)(4) and (5) of the Act does not include a bank that: (1)
publicly solicits brokerage business for which it receives transaction-
related compensation;... (2) Directly or indirectly receives transaction-
related compensation for providing brokerage services for trust,
managing agency or other accounts to which the bank provides advice;
(3) Deals in or underwrites securities.
Id.
69. 50 Fed. Reg. 28385, 28392 (1985).
70. Id.
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The impetus given to the SEC to adopt Rule 3b-9 was the
increase in the number of securities activities banks could perform
as a result of rulings by the various bank regulators and the
courts.7 The SEC concluded that all institutions performing bro-
kerage services should come under the same regulatory scheme
that Congress created for broker-dealers, pursuant to the objec-
tive of ensuring fair competition among securities participants.
Congress felt that it was "in the public interest and appropriate
for the protection of investors and the maintenance of fair and
orderly markets to assure... fair competition among brokers and
dealers, among exchange markets, and between exchange mar-
kets."72 The SEC's mandate in administering the federal securi-
ties laws is to provide a system of securities regulation that will
ensure "the protection of investors through full and fair disclosure
concerning securities sold and the prevention of unfair and inequi-
table practices in the securities markets."7 3 Broker-dealer regis-
tration is an important aspect in assuring fair competition among
the participants in the securities markets, and the SEC felt that
because bank securities activities are regulated under federal
banking laws, where the focus is on the protection of depositors
and the safety and soundness of the bank, bank regulation would
therefore be outside the federal system of securities regulation as
administered by the SEC which could lead to regulatory dispari-
ties.74 Rule 3b-9 was an effort at functional regulation of securi-
ties activities, where banks would be regulated according to their
function, rather than the type of charter they possess.
The consequences of requiring banks to register with the SEC
as broker-dealers would also have subjected banks to many spe-
cific regulations in order to compensate for the differences identi-
fied by the SEC between the federal securities laws regulations
and federal banking law regulations concerning bank securities
activities. First, persons associated with broker-dealers must
pass examinations before they can sell securities or become
involved in the management of a securities firm.75 Second, the
1934 Act imposes an affirmative duty on broker-dealers to ade-
quately supervise its employees in order to prevent violations of
71. Id. at 28386.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(c)(ii) (1986).
73. 50 Fed. Reg. at 28387.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 28387. See, e.g., NASD By-laws, Schedule C, NASD Man. (CCH)
1102A (1983).
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federal securities laws.76 Third, the SEC and the self-regulatory
organizations (hereinafter "SRO") have adopted rules to prohibit
broker-dealers from engaging in sales abuse practices such as
"churning"77 customer accounts in order to increase brokerage
commissions.7" Fourth, broker-dealers must comply with specific
guidelines concerning the content and review of advertisements.79
Fifth, the SEC periodically examines and inspects broker-dealers
as part of its supervisory authority to ensure compliance with the
securities laws. 0
The SEC felt that Rule 3b-9 brought banks within the regula-
tory scope created "with a national public interest which makes it
necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transac-
tions... to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in
such transactions .... 11 The SEC's attempt at functional regula-
tion over bank securities activities, however, was short-lived when
the court held, in ABA v. SEC, that the SEC operated under the
limitations of the 1934 Act and could not regulate banks as bro-
ker-dealers.8 2 The court supported its analysis of why the SEC
did not have the authority to change the statutory definition of a
bank for purposes of Rule 3b-913 by showing Congress' intent to
preclude the SEC from regulating institutions that met the statu-
76. Id. at 28388. Section (b)(4)(E) of the 1934 Act provides an affirmative
defense for failure to supervise if:
(i) there have been established procedures, and a system for applying
such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to prevent and
detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by such other person,
and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations
incumbent upon him by reason of such procedures and system without
reasonable cause to believe that such procedures and system were not
being complied with.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E).
77. "Churning" in the context of securities law is "a course of excessive trading
through which a broker advances his own interests over those of his customer."
Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1367 (7th Cir. 1983).
78. See, e.g., NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, § 35, NASD Man. (CCH)
2195 (1983).
79. 50 Fed. Reg. at 28387.
80. Id. at 28388. While the SEC acknowledges that banks are regularly
examined by the banking agencies, they contend that the focus of the
examinations is on the safety and soundness of the bank rather than investor
protection.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988).
82. ABA, 804 F.2d at 755, 756.
83. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
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tory definition of "bank" in order to avoid duplicative regulation."
The legislative history was clear in stating that definitions in the
bill were "self-explanatory," and the definitions of "broker" and
"dealer" were the "most important... since many of the provisions
of the act apply only to members of exchanges and brokers and
dealers who do business through them." 5 Congress' intent to
exclude institutions that were not included in the definition of
"broker" and "dealer" from the 1934 Act's regulatory provisions
was made clear where the Senate Report stated that "banks are
expressly exempted from the definition of 'broker' and 'dealer'." 6
The court stated that the SEC could not amend the statute exclud-
ing banks from the definition of "broker" and "dealer" through the
rulemaking process and only Congress could make this change
through legislation.8
7
While the court found that Rule 3b-9 was invalid based on the
plain meaning of the statutory language concerning the definition
of "broker," "dealer," and "bank" and because Congress had been
clear in'allocating the responsibility for regulating financial insti-
tutions and markets among various federal agencies,"" the court
was also sympathetic to the SEC's concerns, when it opined:
Given the dramatic changes in the nature of financial institutions
and market practices in the last fifty years, Congress might do
well to undertake a comprehensive reexamination of the Glass-
Steagall Act and the Securities Acts. Indeed, it might well deter-
mine from such a reexamination that banks should be allowed to
engage in brokerage business like any other broker, but that
banks should be regulated by the SEC like any other broker.
8 9
In the final analysis, however, the court would not allow the uni-
lateral action of the SEC to extend its jurisdiction to institutions
regulated by other agencies.
B. Regulatory Structure of Bank Mutual Fund Activities
Banking entities choosing to conduct securities brokerage
activities such as mutual fund brokerage in separate subsidiaries
or affiliates of the bank are regulated by the SEC and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (hereinafter "NASD") in the
84. ABA, 804 F.2d at 744-45.
85. S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
86. Id.
87. ABA, 804 F.2d at 750.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 755.
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same manner as other non-bank brokers and dealers.90 Banks
that choose to operate in this manner are also subject to regula-
tion under the federal banking laws. 91 Banks acting as an invest-
ment adviser through separate companies are regulated under the
Investment Advisers Act and the federal banking laws.92
The OCC is the primary regulator for national banks that are
involved in the direct sales of mutual funds, and currently, these
banks are examined every twelve to eighteen months, depending
on the banks' assets size, their overall condition, and the occur-
rence of a change in control. 93 Banks exempted from the federal
securities laws, as a result of being excluded from the definition of
broker/dealer under the 1934 Act and from regulation under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, are still subject to: (1) the anti-
fraud provisions of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5;
(2) the Interagency Statement on Sales of Nondeposit Investment
Products (which will be discussed in detail later); (3) recordkeep-
ing and confirmation requirements for brokerage customers; (4)
fiduciary regulation under state and federal law; (5) the same
restrictions that apply to non-bank investment advisers in the
Investment Company Act of 1940, for national banks acting as
investment advisers to registered investment companies; (6)
restrictions on transactions with affiliates imposed by section 23A
and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act; and (7) enforcement actions
brought by their primary regulator,94 pursuant to section 1818 of
12 U.S.C. for violations of any law or regulation, for unsafe or
unsound banking practices, or for any violation of any condition
imposed in writing by the appropriate 'federal banking agency in
connection with the grant of any application or other request by
the bank.95
The anti-fraud provisions under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the SEC were designed to protect
investors, to assure fair dealings in the securities markets and to
promote ethical business practices.96 Congress designed section
10(b) to be a catch-all provision which has an infinite variety of
90. See Ludwig Testimony, supra note 6, at 12.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 11.
94. The Federal Reserve is the primary regulator for a state-chartered bank
that is a member of the Federal Reserve System. The FDIC is the primary
regulator for a state-chartered, non-member bank.
95. Ludwig Testimony, supra note 6, at 12.
96. Rule 10b-5 states:
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practices which are proscribed under the statute.97 Although sec-
tion 10(b) does not create an express private right of action, the
federal courts have recognized a private remedy under section
10(b).98
Another regulatory tool utilized by the OCC in the regulation
of bank mutual fund activities is found in the recordkeeping and
confirmation requirements for brokerage customers. 99 Every
national bank effecting securities transactions for customers must
keep records for each customer showing all purchases and sales of
securities, keep a separate record showing whether each order to
purchase or sell was a market order, limit order, or other special
order, record the price at which the order was executed, and rec-
ord the broker/dealer utilized. 100 Additionally, each bank must
have written policies and procedures designed to prevent the prac-
tice of "front-running.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the niails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240, 10b-5.
97. See generally ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEwis D. LowENFELs, SECURITI
FRAuD AND CoMoDrrmis FRAUD § 1.4 (1984).
98. The Supreme Court recognized "[tihe existence of this implied remedy is
simply beyond peradventure." MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
99. 12 C.F.R. § 12.1 (1993).
100. 12 C.F.R. § 12.3 (1993).
101. "Front-running" is the practice of executing an order by a broker or dealer
to purchase or sell a security for his own account, prior to executing a like order
for a customer, thereby placing his interests before the clients. Section 12.6
states:
That bank officers and employees who make investment
recommendations or decisions for the accounts of customers, who
participate in the determination of such recommendations or decisions,
or who, in connection with their duties, obtain information concerning
which securities are being purchased or sold or recommended for such
action, must report to the bank, within ten days after the end of the
calendar quarter, all transactions in securities made by them or on their
behalf ... The report shall identify the securities purchased or sold and
indicate the dates of the transactions....
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Furthermore, banks involved in mutual fund activities would
be subject to fiduciary obligations imposed by state and federal
laws.10 2 National banks exercising investment discretion must
have written policies and procedures in place to ensure that their
brokerage placement activities comply with all laws and regula-
tions.10 3 These policies and procedures should address the selec-
tion of persons conducting these transactions and the
reasonableness of brokerage commissions paid to them, any acqui-
sition of research services in return for brokerage commissions,
the allocation of research or other services among accounts, and
the need to disclose these policies and procedures to customers. 104
Another major regulatory tool available to banks' primary
regulator is provided by the broad reach of section 1818 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. The primary regulator of a bank
can bring a cease-and-desist proceeding against an insured insti-
tution or any institution-affiliated party if the agency believes
either party:
[I]s engaging or has engaged, or the agency has reasonable cause
to believe that the depository institution or any institution-affili-
ated party is about to engage, in an unsafe or unsound practice10 5
in conducting the business of such depository institution, or is vio-
lating or has violated, or the agency has reasonable cause to
believe that the depository institution or any institution-affiliated
party is about to violate, a law, rule, or regulation, or any condi-
tion imposed in writing by the agency .... 106
If a cease-and-desist order is issued, the institution or its
institution-affiliated parties must take affirmative action to cor-
rect the violation or unsafe or unsound practice. 10 7 Under the
authority to issue an order to take affirmative action to correct
12 C.F.R. § 12.6(d) (1993).
102. See 12 C.F.R. § 9 (1993).
103. 12 C.F.R. § 9.5 (1993).
104. Id.
105. There is no statutory definition of "unsafe or unsound banking practice."
The concept of unsafe or unsound practice touches the entire operation of a bank.
The legislative history indicates:
[An unsafe or unsound practice embraces any action, or lack of action,
which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation,
the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk
or loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the insurance
fund administered by the corporation.
EDwARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHiTE, BANKING LAw 553-54 (1991).
106. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1988).
107. Id.
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any violation or unsafe or unsound practice, the agency may
require the institution or affiliated party to make restitution for a
loss if the institution or affiliated party was unjustly enriched or if
the violation or practice involved a reckless disregard for the law
or any applicable regulation. l0 8 This statute also gives the bank-
ing agency a wide range of other remedies to pursue, which
include the authority to restrict the growth of an institution, 0 9
remove or suspend any party from the institution or affiliate of the
institution,110 or take any other action the banking agency deter-
mines is appropriate.'
In addition, section 1818 provides for monetary damages for
institutions or affiliated parties ranging from five thousand dol-
lars per day up to a total of one million dollars, depending on the
level of scienter, for the violation of laws or regulations, for engag-
ing in unsafe or unsound practices, or for breaches of any fiduciary
duty.112 Finally, the statute provides that the federal banking
agency must publish any final order that resulted from an admin-
istrative enforcement proceeding in an effort to deter improper
conduct."13
It is clear that section 1818 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act gives the banking regulators a wide range of enforcement
powers for violations of laws or regulations, engaging in unsafe
and unsound practices, and for breaches of fiduciary duties. This
section is heavily relied upon by bank regulators in their efforts to
regulate the securities activities of banks.
C. Interagency Statement on Nondeposit Investment Products
In the past, the four federal banking agencies which includes
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, have issued
separate guidelines for the retail sale of nondeposit investment
products. 114 These agencies issued a joint statement on February
108. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(A) (1988).
109. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(B) (1988).
110. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (1988).
111. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(F) (1988).
112. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (1988).
113. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u) (1988).
114. See OCC Banking Circular No. 274 (July 19, 1993); FDIC Supervisory
Statement FIL-71-93 (Oct. 8, 1993); Federal Reserve Letters SR 93-35 (June 17,
1993), SR 91-14 (June 6, 1991); OTS Thrift Bulletin 23-1 (Sept. 7, 1993).
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15, 1994, which was intended to consolidate the various guide-
lines." 5 The agencies' action was a result of the recognition of the
expanded role that financial institutions have taken concerning
the selling of retail nondeposit investment products, including
mutual funds, and the need to ensure that customers are clearly
informed of the risks associated with these products. 116 The
guidelines contained in the Interagency Statement apply to recom-
mendations or sales- of mutual funds made by employees of the
institution, sales made by employees of a third party which may or
may not be a bank affiliate, or sales made from a referral of retail
customers by the bank to a third party where the bank receives a
referral fee (this is commonly known as a networking
arrangement).1 17
The Interagency Statement recommends that the bank adopt
a written statement addressing the risks involved with a sales
program along with a summary of policies and procedures of the
institution's program."" It is the responsibility of the institution's
board of directors to adopt and periodically review the policies and
procedures. 119 The policies and procedures should contain compli-
ance procedures, provisions for the supervision of employees
involved in sales by senior management, review of the types of
products sold, the permissibility of the use of the institution's cus-
tomer information in connection with retail sales of nondeposit
investment products, and a designation of the employees author-
ized to sell these investment products. In fact, the thrust of the
Interagency Statement is to provide guidance to financial institu-
tions concerning: (1) disclosure and advertising; (2) setting and
circumstances under which recommendations or sales of mutual
funds should take place within the banks; (3) qualification and
training of personnel involved in the sales of these products; (4)
suitability and sales practices; (5) compensation of the sales force;
and (6) compliance procedures. 120
115. See Nondeposit Investment Sales Examination Procedures, OCC Bulletin
94-14 (Feb. 24, 1994) (integrating the Interagency Statement on Retail Sales on
Nondeposit Investment Products) [hereinafter Interagency Statement].
116. Id. at 20. The risks identified concerning these investment products are:
"(1) the products are not insured by the FDIC; (2) they are not deposits or other
obligations of the institution and are not guaranteed by the institution; and (3)
they are subject to investment risks, including the possible loss of principal." Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 21.
119. See Interagency Statement, supra note 115, at 21.
120. Id. at 22-26.
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The banking agencies are very concerned that the recommen-
dation or sales of investment products are performed in a manner
that assures these products are differentiated from FDIC insured
products.12 ' Guidelines are provided concerning the content and
form of the disclosures given to customers, the timing of the disclo-
sures, type of disclosures that should be made in advertisements
and promotional materials, and disclosure information concerning
the "existence of an advisory or other material relationship
between the institution or an affiliate of the institution and an
investment company whose shares are sold by the institu-
tion ... ."122 In addition, the nondeposit investment product must
not have a name that is identical to the institution in order to
avoid customer confusion. 123
Next, the Interagency Statement recommends that institu-
tions should minimize the risk of customer confusion by con-
ducting recommendations or sales of mutual funds in distinct
physical areas from where retail deposits are taken.124 It is also
strongly urged that tellers should not make general or specific
investment recommendations concerning nondeposit investment
products while the tellers are in their routine deposit taking
areas. 12
5
Another major area addressed by the Interagency Statement
is the adequacy of training provided for the personnel authorized
to sell mutual funds for banks. Banks selling securities directly
are excluded from the definition of broker/dealer found in the 1934
Act, and as a result, personnel selling securities for banks are not
required to be registered with the SEC. 126 The Interagency State-
ment recommends that sales personnel receive training which pro-
121. Id. at 22.
122. Id. at 23.
123. Id. Although the SEC has not adopted any rules or regulations
prohibiting mutual funds' use of common names, the Division of Investment
Management believes that "common names between federally insured
institutions and funds sold or marketed by or through such institutions are
presumptively misleading." See Memorandum from Barbara Green & Thomas S.
Harman to former SEC Chairman Breeden, 824 PLI/Corp. 147 (May 6, 1993)
(discussing bank mutual fund names). This presumption, however, can be
overcome by a prominent disclosure on the fund's prospectus stating the shares
are not deposits or obligations of the bank, and they are not insured by the FDIC
or any other agency. Id.
124. Interagency Statement, supra note 115, at 24.
125. Id.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69 which discusses bank exclusion
from the 1934 Act.
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vides for knowledge of the investment products offered, applicable
legal restrictions and customer protection requirements. 127 The
type of training that should be given, according to the guidance for
examiners reviewing bank nondeposit investment sales activities,
is contained in the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD. 128 Even
though these rules do not expressly apply to bank sales personnel,
they should be the "appropriate reference for a bank compliance
program designed to ensure that the bank's retail sales of all
nondeposit investment products are operated in a safe and sound
manner."
129
In the area of investment suitability, it is recommended that
bank personnel should have reasonable grounds for believing the
recommended investment is suitable for a customer based on
information disclosed by the customer.130 Again, the standard
used by the bank examiners to determine if a recommendation or
sale is suitable to the customer is the NASD Rules of Fair Prac-
tice.' 3 ' Suitability determinations should include information
concerning the customer's financial and tax status, investment
objective and other relevant factors prior to making recommenda-
tions to the customer. 132 The examiners will pay particular atten-
tion to suitability determinations for elderly bank customers.
1 33
In the area of compensation for employees of institutions
involved in mutual fund sales, employees not involved directly in
selling to customers, i.e. tellers, 'are allowed to receive a one-time
nominal fee for referring customers to nondeposit investment
products.13 4 Employees authorized to sell these products may
127. Interagency Statement, supra note 115, at 24.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 25.
131. Id. at 10.
132. Interagency Statement, supra note 115, at 10. The examiners believe that
a proper suitability inquiry will protect banks from dissatisfied customers who
threaten litigation which could put the banks' capital at risk. Id. The OCC could
determine that banks without appropriate suitability procedures are engaging in
unsafe and unsound banking practice. Id.
133. Id. Many elderly customers are on fixed incomes and rely on savings for
retirement income. These customers are susceptible to purchasing investments
offering higher yields than bank certificate of deposits. It is important that banks
make careful suitability judgments for these customers because it will be difficult
for them to recover from a loss of principal. Id.
134. Id. at 25.
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receive commissions as long as the compensation program does
not result in unsuitable recommendations or sales. 1 3 5
Finally, the Interagency Statement suggests that institutions
develop policies and procedures to ensure that sales activities are
conducted in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.'
3 6
These procedures should identify potential conflicts of interest
and provide a system to, monitor and resolve customer
complaints. 13
7
.The customers' interest will be the focus of bank examina-
tions of institutions engaging in mutual fund activities. The main
concerns are the potential for customer confusion as to the unin-
sured nature of nondeposit investment products and the potential
for violations of the general anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act,
which apply whether or not the sellers of those investment prod-
ucts are registered as broker/dealers with the SEC.13 8 Banks that
do not adequately address these issues could be operating in an
unsafe and unsound manner, subjecting them to all the penalties
of the federal banking laws. 139
IV. ADEQUACY OF THE INTERAGENCY STATEMENT FOR
REGULATING BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
Under the current regulatory structure for banks offering
mutual fund investments, the SEC has regulatory oversight
authority over bank personnel who sell securities on the premises
of the bank if they are employed by registered broker-dealers. The
SEC regulatory powers would encompass bank subsidiaries and
affiliates because they are not covered by the bank exclusions
found in the 1934 Act. 140 The authority-to regulate personnel of
banks that are involved in the direct sale of securities is vested
with the federal banking regulators. 141 Because of the potential
for regulatory arbitrage resulting from this split in the regulatory
135. The examiners suggest that mutual fund sales function and the certificate
of deposit renewal function should be separate in order to avoid a compensation
system that promotes mutual fund sales. Id. at 11.
136. Interagency Statement, supra note 115, at 3.
137. Id. at 25.
138. Id. at 2.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 92-113 discussing remedies available
to bank regulators under the federal banking laws.
140. See Memorandum from Barbara Green & Thomas S. Harman to former
SEC Chairman Breeden, supra note 123 (responding to question five concerning
bank personnel compliance with federal securities laws).
141. Id.
[Vol. 17:11
26
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss1/3
BANKING LAW
scheme for banks, there has been a renewed effort to subject
securities activities to functional regulation.142
It is anticipated that the problems presented by regulatory
arbitrage will increase as a result of the growing number of banks
that are expanding their mutual fund activities, and this trend is
expected to continue to grow at an accelerated rate due to the pro-
posed merger between Mellon Bank Corporation and the Dreyfus
Corporation. 143 The SEC feels that the current regulatory scheme
and the tools available to the federal banking regulators are inad-
equate to deal with the risk of investor confusion, the potential for
conflicts of interest between banks and affiliated mutual funds,
and the need for a regulatory system that focuses on investor pro-
tection rather than the protection of depositors and the safety and
soundness of the bank.144
One major difference in the protection provided for investors
between the Interagency Statement and the federal securities laws
is apparent in the area of bank broker-dealer activities. Under
the requirements of the federal securities laws, broker-dealers
have been required to register with the SEC since 1935 because of
the broker-dealer's role as an intermediary between customers
and the securities markets. 14  Section 15(a) of the 1934 Act
requires that any broker or dealer using the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce to induce or effect transac-
tions in securities must register as a broker-dealer with the
SEC.1 46 Registered broker-dealers are subject to numerous regu-
lations and supervisory structures intended to protect investors
and the securities markets. They must be members of a SRO
(self-regulatory organization), 147 and the Securities Investor Pro-
142. Functional regulation would provide for uniform rules consistently
applied to all market participants regardless of whether they are banks or
securities firms. See Testimony of Chairman Levitt, supra note 8, at 4.
143. The Dreyfus Corporation is a registered investment adviser to mutual
funds with $72.2 billion in assets. Mellon Bank Corporation, a bank holding
company, and Mellon Bank also act as investment advisers. Once the merger is
completed, Mellon Bank and its affiliates will be the largest bank mutual fund
investment adviser, managing $76.8 billion in mutual fund assets. Id. at 1-3.
144. Id. at 4.
145. See Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 409-10 (2d.
ed. 1988).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1988).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(bX8) (1988).
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tection Corporation (hereinafter "SIPC").148 In addition, broker-
dealers are subject to statutory disqualification standards and dis-
ciplinary authority,149 which are designed to prevent persons with
an adverse disciplinary history from becoming associated with
registered broker-dealers. They are also subject to the net capital
requirements to maintain sufficient capital to operate safely.150
Broker-dealers must also maintain adequate competency levels by
satisfying SRO qualification requirements.1 51 Furthermore, bro-
ker-dealers have extensive recordkeeping and reporting obliga-
tions, 152 fiduciary duties, 5 3 antifraud rules, 5 and the SEC's
broad enforcement authority over broker-dealers. 155
The federal securities regulatory scheme provides a compre-
hensive set of regulations covering all aspects of broker-dealer
activities. The federal banking laws, however, do not provide a
comparable regulatory scheme for broker-dealer activities that are
done directly by banks. The Interagency Statement provides only
for "guidelines," "recommendations," and "suggestions" to cover
many of the broker-dealer activities that are covered in the federal
securities laws. These "guidelines" are not directly enforceable by
bank regulators or by bank customers. In order for bank regula-
tors to penalize a bank for violating the "guidelines," it must be
shown that the bank was being operated in an unsafe and
unsound manner or in violation of law or regulation.15 6
The disparity of regulation in the area of suitability and sales
practices is of particular concern to the SEC.157 The SEC is joined
by members of Congress who also feel that the federal banking
laws are not equipped to adequately deal with the potential
148. 15 U.S.C. 78ccc(aX2) (1988) (SIPC is an insurance fund created to protect
customers, in an amount up to one hundred thousand dollars in cash and up to
five hundred thousand dollars for an amount of securities held by a broker-dealer
on behalf of the customer, in the event the broker-dealer becomes insolvent.
SIPC does not insure against the loss in value of securities due to broker-dealer
misconduct.).
149. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(39), 78o(bX4), 78o(b)(6) (1988 and Supp. II 1990).
150. 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1 (1993).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(bX7) (1988).
152. 17 C.F.R. 240.17a-3, 17a-4, 17a-5 (1993).
153. See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) ("A securities dealer
occupies a special relationship to a buyer of securities in that by his position he
impliedly represents he has an adequate basis for the opinion he renders.").
154. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1993).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1988).
156. Interagency Statement, supra note 115, at 1.
157. See Testimony of Chairman Levitt, supra note 8, at 15.
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abuses that could occur when banks are involved directly with the
sale of mutual funids. 15  For example, Congressman Dingell
described how bank securities salespersons targeted the "weak,
meek, and ignorant" while the Comptroller of the Currency stood
"between the fox and the henhouse ... without some of the most
basic weapons that have evolved to protect securities investors -
express suitability requirements...." 1 59 , In addition, Chairman
Levitt pointed out that the guidance provided in the Interagency
Statement concerning suitability and sales practice does not
directly refer to the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice. 160 The Inter-
agency Statement addresses these practices by stating that bank
personnel involved in selling securities products "must adhere to
fair and reasonable sales practices" and "they should have reason-
able grounds for believing that the specific product recommended
is suitable for the particular customer."
161
On the other hand, registered broker-dealers are subject to
extensive regulation by the federal security laws and the SRO's
rules in the areas of suitability and sales practices. The NASD
Rules of Fair Practice were implemented to prevent fraudulent
and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equita-
ble principles of trade, and to protect investors' and the public
interests.162 Accordingly, broker-dealers must evaluate the finan-
cial circumstances and needs of their customers and make a deter-
mination that any security recommended is suitable for that
customer in light of the customer's financial circumstances and
investment intent."a Practices that clearly violate the responsi-
bility of fair dealing includes both "churning," which is the exces-
sive trading in a customer's account, and the trading of mutual
158. Public Policy Issues Surrounding the Proposed Merger Between the
Dreyfuss Corp. and Mellon Bank Corp., Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigation of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
(opening statement of Chairman John D. Dingell on second day of testimony).
159. Id.
160. Testimony of Chairman Levitt, supra note 8, at 15. However, bank
examiners are instructed to use the NASD Rules of Fair Practice in their bank
examinations to determine whether a recommendation or sale is suitable to the
customer. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
161. Interagency Statement, supra note 115, at 25.
162. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III. § 1, NASD Man. (CCH) 2151
(1989).
163. See NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III. § 2, NASD Man. (CCH) 2152
(1989).
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funds on a short-term basis.1 6' The Policy of the Board of Gover-
nors of NASD makes it clear that mutual funds are not proper
trading vehicles, and trading on a short-term basis alone raises
the question of a rule violation.
165
In addition, section 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act gives the SEC the
regulatory authority over a broker-dealer for the violation of the
federal securities laws by any person associated with that broker-
dealer. 16 6 There is an affirmative defense available to the broker-
dealer for failure to supervise if:
(i) there have been established procedures, and a system for
applying such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to
prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by
such other person, and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and
obligations incumbent upon him by reason of such procedures and
system without reasonable cause to believe that such procedures
and system were not being complied with. 167
This defense provides the broker-dealer with a strong incentive to
establish and actively monitor procedures designed to prevent vio-
lations of the federal securities laws by associates of the broker-
dealer.
Legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives
that would effectively provide for functional regulation of bank
securities activities by amending "the Federal securities laws to
equalize the regulatory treatment of participants in the securities
industry."' 68 As could be expected, Chairman Levitt clearly sup-
ports this effort, which is evidenced by his following statement:
H.R. 3447 would serve investors by applying proven, legally
enforceable broker-dealer competency standards, supervision
requirements, suitability and sales practice rules, and financial
responsibility requirements to banks and bank employees
involved in securities sales. The legislation would address the
conflicts of interest between banks and their affiliated investment
companies .... In general, by eliminating the unconditional bank
exclusions in the federal securities laws, H.R. 3447 would promote
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1988).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1988).
168. H.R. 3447, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter H.R. 3447]. This bill
was sponsored by Representative John D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, on
November 4, 1993.
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consistent, functional regulation of all market participants that
offer the same products and perform the same functions.
169
In addition, Matthew P. Fink, president of the Investment Com-
pany Institute, has called for functional regulation of bank securi-
ties activities in order to avoid placing investors "in harm's way"
by' banks whose mutual fund activities are not subject to SEC
regulation.
170
The portions of House Bill 3447 affecting bank mutual fund
activities that will be discussed include: (1) the elimination of the
federal securities laws' exemption for banks engaged in broker-
dealer activities; (2) the elimination of the exclusions for banks
under the Investment Advisers Act; and, (3) the attempt to elimi-
nate customer confusion concerning the risk of loss due to the lack
of FDIC insurance on mutual fund investments. For the most
part, House Bill 3447 would amend section 3(a)(4) of the 1934 Act
to include most bank securities activities in the definition of the
term "broker."' 7 ' Also, the bill would remove the exclusion of
banks from the definition of "dealer" in section 3(a)(5) of the 1934
Act. 172
169. Testimony of Chairman Levitt, supra note 8, at 16 (quoting Chairman
Levitt in a letter to Chairman John D. Dingell and Henry B. Gonzalez concerning
the proposed merger between Mellon Bank and the Dreyfuss Corp. (Jan. 7,
1994)).
170. Cope, Bank Regulators Said to Muddy Waters, AM. BANKER, Mar. 24,
1994, at 12.
171. H.R. 3447 § 101. Section 101 of House Bill 3447 statesi
(4)(A) The term "broker" means any person engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others. •
(B) A bank shall not be deemed to be a 'broker' because it engages in
one or more of the following activities:
(i) Engages in fiduciary activities (including effecting transactions
in the course of such fiduciary activities) permissible under the first
section of the Act of September 28, 1962 (12 U.S.C. 92a), or for State
banks under relevant State trust law, except that a bank shall be
deemed a broker if, in the conduct of such fiduciary activities, it-
(I) publicly solicits brokerage business; or
(II) is compensated for such business by the payment of
commissions or similar renumeration based on effecting transactions in
securities (excluding fees calculated as percentage of assets under
management).
(ii) Effects transactions in exempted securities, other than
municipal securities, or in commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or
commercial bills.
Id.
172. Id. at § 102. Section 102 states:
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The proposed bill would require banks falling within the defi-
nition of broker or dealer to place most of their securities activities
into a separate corporate entity that would be subject to the fed-
eral securities laws. 73 Specifically, this would place the banks
under the SEC and SRO rules designed to protect investors. In
addition, all participants in securities activities would be placed
on equal-footing in terms of regulation, thus reducing the exist-
ence of regulatory arbitrage presently available based on industry
classification. 174 The most significant benefit to investors of plac-
ing bank securities activities under SEC regulation would be that
investors could seek redress for violations of federal securities
laws by brokers and dealers through the SRO arbitration process.
The resolution of disputes through arbitration, rather than by
bringing actions in federal court, is a more practical way for an
investor to settle most claims because it is less expensive and
more expeditious. 175
Provisions are made in House Bill 3447 that would not place
undue burdens on banks engaged in certain security activities.
First, the Commission is given the authority to exempt persons
from the definition of broker-dealer or from the requirement that
bank securities activities must be placed in separate corporate
entities if "such exemption is consistent with the public interest,
the protection of investors, and the purposes of this title."'76 Also,
banks engaging in traditional fiduciary functions where securities
brokerage activities are not advertised publicly and transaction-
(5)(A) The term "dealer" means any person engaged in the business of
buying and selling securities for his own account through a broker or
otherwise.
(B) Such term does not include-
(i) any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own
account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as
part of a regular business; or
(ii) any bank insofar as the bank (I) buys and sells commercial
paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills, or exempted securities
other than municipal securities; or (II) buys and sells securities for
investment purposes for the bank or for accounts in which the bank,
acting as trustee, is authorized to determine the securities to be
purchased or sold.
Id.
173. Id. at § 104.
174. Id.
175. See generally MARILYN B. CANE & PATRICIA A. SHUB, SECURITIES
ARIrrRATION LAw AND PROCEDURES (1991).
176. H.R. 3447 § 103.
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based compensation is not received, would be excluded from the
definition of "broker."177 Additionally, section 102 of the bill would
exempt banks from the definition of "dealer": "(1) [if the bank]
buys and sells commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, commer-
cial bills, or exempted securities other that municipal securities;
or (2) buys and sells securities for investment purposes for the
bank or for accounts in which the bank acts as trustee."178
Secondly, House Bill 3447 would remove the exclusion for
banks and bank holding companies from regulation under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.179 Under the current regulatory
scheme, a bank acting as an investment adviser to a registered
investment company would be subject to regulation under the fed-
eral banking laws in its fiduciary capacity.'8 0 The SEC would
have regulatory authority over the investment company advised
by the bank, but not over the bank as an investment adviser
because of the bank exemption from the definition of an invest-
ment adviser.18 1
Section 202(a)(11)(A) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
would be amended to include any bank or bank holding company
acting as an investment adviser to a registered investment com-
pany to be within the definition of an investment adviser.18 2 This
amendment would allow the SEC to regulate a bank or a bank
holding company acting as an investment adviser to a mutual
fund in the same manner as any other investment adviser to a
registered investment company.18 3
Third, the requirement that banks place most of their securi-
ties activities into a separate corporate entity and the prohibition
against the use of a bank's name by an affiliated investment com-
177. See supra note 171.
178. H.R. 3447 § 102; see supra note 172.
179. Section 202(a)(11)(A) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 states:
Investment adviser means any person who, for compensation, engages
in the business of advising others, either directly or through
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as a part of a regular business, issues or promulgates
analysis or reports concerning securities; but does not include (A) a
bank, or any bank holding company as defined in the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 which is not an investment company.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(aXl1) (1988).
180. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(A) (1988).
182. H.R. 3447 § 120.
183. Testimony of Chairman Levitt, supra note 8, at 18.
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pany,' 8 ' are designed to eliminate customer confusion regarding
the lack of federal deposit insurance on mutual funds sold by
banks.18 5
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt concerning the phenomenal growth in the
mutual fund industry. Since 1980, mutual fund assets have
increased twelve-fold, with most of the growth coming from net
purchases of fund shares by the public rather than from price
appreciation.'8 6 Investors in these funds chose to move their
funds out of depository institutions, as a result of a drop in inter-
est rates on deposits, in order to take advantage of the rise in
stock and bond prices that have generated higher returns.18 7
Banks have responded to the pressure placed on them by the
deposit outflows by drastically increasing their activity in mutual
fund alternatives. 188
Under the current regulatory scheme, banks directly engaged
in mutual fund activities are regulated under the federal banking
laws by the OCC, whereas bank subsidiaries and non-bank affili-
ates engaged in mutual fund activities must be registered broker-
dealers that are subject to SEC regulation under the federal
securities laws. All entities engaged in mutual fund activities are
subject to the general antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws.
The regulatory tools provided to the banking regulators by
the federal banking laws were designed to provide for the protec-
tion of depositors and for the safety and soundness of the bank. In
order for banking regulators to deal with institutions heavily
involved in securities activities, they adopted the Interagency
Statement on Retail Sales on Nondeposit Investment Products
which provides "guidelines" for banks to follow in their securities
sales programs. Violations of these guidelines could be considered
184. H.R. 3447 § 116. Section 116 states: "It shall be deceptive and misleading
for any registered investment company which has as an investment adviser or
distributor a bank or affiliated person thereof, to adopt, as part of the name, title,
or logo of such company, or of any security of which it is the issuer, any word or
design which is the same as or similar to, or a variation of, the name, title, or logo
of such bank." Id.
185. Testimony of Chairman Levitt, supra note 8, at 17.
186. Phillip Mack & Michael A. Schoendeck, Recent Trends in the Mutual Fund
Industry, 79 FED. REs. BuLL. 1001 (1993).
187. Id.
188. See generally Ludwig Testimony, supra note 6.
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unsafe and unsound banking practices which could invoke penal-
ties under the federal banking laws.18 9 The remedies available
under the federal banking laws dealing with violations involving
the sales of securities, however, are not as comprehensive as those
available under the federal securities laws.
The SEC made its first attempt at "functional regulation" of
securities activities with the adoption of Rule 3b-9 in 1985.
Although the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia declared the rule invalid, most banks transferred their
brokerage operations to registered broker-dealer entities prior to
the invalidation of the rule.190 Many banks have retained this
arrangement even after the rule was held invalid.' 9'
While previous efforts to allow for functional regulation of
securities activities have failed, the time is right to give the SEC
the authority to regulate all securities activities, regardless of
whether the entity engaging in the activities is a bank or a securi-
ties firm. First, the regulatory arbitrage that exists in the current
regulatory scheme would be eliminated. This would provide a con-
sistent, uniform, standard of regulation regardless of whether an
investor purchased a mutual fund from a bank or a registered bro-
ker-dealer. 92 Next, functional regulation would eliminate the
regulatory gap which results in the SEC being unable to regulate
bank securities activities which represents a rapidly growing com-
ponent of the securities markets in the United States. 93 In order
for the SEC to effectively oversee the securities industry and
maintain fair and orderly markets, it is necessary for the SEC to
have regulatory authority over all participants in those mar-
kets.19 4 Most importantly, investor protection would be enhanced
by functional regulation. The federal securities laws provide for a
wider range of private rights of action for investors who have been
the victims of fraudulent sales practices. If bank sales of securi-
ties were required to be done through regulated broker-dealers,
investors seeking compensation for violations of federal securities
189. Ludwig Testimony, supra note 6, at 9.
190. See MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURrrIEs AcTivrrIEs OF BANKs, § 10.05 (1991).
191. The Federal Reserve Board estimates that eighty-five percent of bank-
related brokerage operations occur in SEC-regulated entities. Legislative
Hearing on H.R. 3447, the 'Securities Regulatory Equality Act of 1993," Before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 n.5
(1994) (testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency).
192. Testimony of Chairman Levitt, supra note 8, at 5.
193. Id. at 24.
194. Id.
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laws by the broker-dealers would have access to the SRO arbitra-
tion process. This process is a more efficient method of resolving
disputes than having to resort to the federal courts. For these rea-
sons, the bank exclusion from the statutory provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws defining "broker/dealer" and "investment
adviser" should be eliminated, which would result in the SEC
obtaining functional regulation of all participants in the securities
markets.
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